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The Position of Accountants Under the
Securities Act *
By George O. May

I have been asked to discuss tonight the securities act of 1933
from the point of view of the accountant. Few, if any, measures
have ever been passed possessing so much importance to the pro
fession, and it is not possible within the limits of a single address
to consider all the questions of interest to us which it raises. I
propose to limit my discussion mainly to two points: the liability
arising under section 11 of the act, and the powers to define ac
counting terms and make regulations granted to the federal trade
commission by section 19 of the act. As I shall point out later,
section 19 may afford a means of mitigating to some extent the
harshness of section 11.
No one who has watched closely the developments of the past
ten years can wonder that a securities law should be enacted, or
even be greatly surprised at the form which it has taken. Nor
would it occasion surprise if more recent revelations should prove
to have made it difficult to bring about modifications in the act or
perhaps have created a demand for still more drastic measures.
But to say that legislation was natural, and perhaps inevitable, is
not to approve all its provisions; and while the act possesses many
merits, the wisdom of some of its provisions (notably those pro
visions relating to the liability of underwriters, directors, officers
and experts) is open to serious question in the minds of those
genuinely interested in the protection of investors.
It is a commonplace that extreme measures defeat their own
purpose; but people are seldom willing to give practical effect to
this commonplace. Fifteen years ago, we adopted a constitu
tional amendment designed to put an end to admittedly great
evils. When legislation enacted in pursuance of that amendment
proved ineffective, we passed more severe measures; but as the law
became more drastic, its enforcement became more and more
impossible. Yesterday, we took the final step to reverse the wellintentioned but unwise action of fifteen years ago. We all realize,
however, that it will take years to eradicate the evils which that
unwise action brought into existence. Surely there is a lesson
here for those who seek to regulate the issue of securities.
* An address before the Illinois Society of Certified Public Accountants at Chicago, Illinois,
December 6, 1933.
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Many who originally supported the prohibition movement,
including, as I particularly recall, a bishop of the church, finally
became convinced that it should be repealed on the simple ground
that it placed the distribution of liquor in the worst possible hands.
In the same way, a too drastic securities law will place the distri
bution of securities in the worst possible hands.
I can not believe that a law is just, or can long be maintained in
effect, which deliberately contemplates the possibility that a
purchaser may recover from a person from whom he has not
bought, in respect of a statement which at the time of his purchase
he had not read, contained in a document which he did not then
know to exist, a sum which is not to be measured by injury result
ing from falsity in such statement. Yet, under the securities act
as it stands, once a material misstatement or omission is proved, it
is no defense to show that the plaintiff had no knowledge of the
statement in question or of the document in which it was con
tained, or that the fall in the value of the security which he has
purchased is due, not to the misstatement or omission complained
of, but to quite different causes, such as the natural progress of
invention, or even fire or earthquake. The securities act not only
abandons the old rule that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff,
but the doctrine of contributory negligence and the seemingly
sound theory that there should be some relation between the in
jury caused and the sum to be recovered.
It is frequently suggested that the act follows closely the Eng
lish law; but as one who has followed the development of the
English law for nearly forty years I am bound to say that whether
this statement be regarded as praise or censure, it is unfounded.
None of the departures from ordinary legal principles to which I
have referred finds its counterpart in the English law. The
right of rescission is enforceable only against the issuer, and before
the purchaser can recover from a director or other person con
cerned in the issue he must show that he relied on the prospectus,
and then can recover only for injury due to the untrue statement
which he proves.
Finally, as indicating the difference in temper of the English
law, let me read a section which deals not with this specific ques
tion, but with the liability of directors and officers to the corpora
tion for negligence or breach of trust:
“ If in any proceeding for negligence, default, breach of duty, or
breach of trust against a person to whom this section applies it
10
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appears to the court hearing the case that that person is or may
be liable in respect of the negligence, default, breach of duty or
breach of trust, but that he has acted honestly and reasonably,
and that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, in
cluding those connected with his appointment, he ought fairly
to be excused for the negligence, default, breach of duty or breach
of trust, that court may relieve him, either wholly or partly, from
his liability on such terms as the court may think fit.” (Com
panies act, sec. 372 (1).)

The answer of congress to those who urged that the English law
should not be followed because it was too severe and tended to
check the flow of capital into industry, was that of the son of
Solomon, who, refusing to listen to the elders, and following the
advice of the young men, said: “My father hath chastised you
with whips, but I will chastise you with scorpions.” And you
will remember that the answer was, “What portion have we in
David? ... to your tents, O Israel,” and the biblical narrative
concludes with the statement, “So Israel rebelled from the house
of David unto this day.” So, too, there is reason to fear that
responsible people will refuse to accept the unfair liability imposed
on them by congress under this act, and will continue to refuse
until juster provisions are enacted. If they do so, their action can
only be regarded as the course dictated by common prudence, and
not as indicating factious opposition to the main purpose of the act.
If we limit our consideration of the liability provisions of the
act to their effect on accountants, their punitive character be
comes even more apparent. As between an innocent but negli
gent vendor and an innocent but negligent purchaser, there may
be some consideration of public policy in favor of requiring the
vendor to return what he has received if his representations are
proved to be false in fact, although he believed them to be true.
This consideration may be particularly applicable where the pur
chaser is a small investor who has neither the ability nor the
resources for determining the truth which are at the command of
the vendor. It is difficult to see, however, upon what principle of
justice the accountant or other expert whose good faith is not
challenged, but who is held to have failed to live up to the high
standard of care required of him, can fairly be called upon to do
more than make good the injury attributable to such failure for
the benefit of a purchaser who perhaps did not even know of his
existence at the time of the purchase, and took no pains whatever
to investigate the security he purchased.
11
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But even though we feel the provisions to be unjust, we can not
expect them to be modified merely because they are unacceptable
to accountants. The hope of securing amendment lies in demon
strating that they are not in the interest of the general public, or of
the investing public in particular; and this seems to me to be
so clearly the case that there should not be any great difficulty in
demonstrating it to open-minded people possessing some general
familiarity with business. I believe anyone who will take the
trouble to consider carefully the work of the accountant in con
nection with new issues, and the practical consequences of these
new provisions will be forced to the conclusion that in the public
interest these provisions should be substantially modified.
The services of the accountant in connection with a new issue,
are, broadly, to report upon statements relating to the financial
position and operations of the issuer. The first important point
to be noted is, that while the statements in question rest on a
basis of fact, the facts in the case of any considerable business
enterprise are both complex and incomplete, so that any report
upon them is predominantly an expression of judgment and
opinion. To illustrate—the most important single figure will
usually be the profits for a particular year. Only the slightest
consideration is necessary to bring realization of the fact that the
transactions of the year are inextricably interrelated with those of
earlier and subsequent years, and that how much profit is fairly
attributable to a particular year is ultimately a matter of conven
tion and judgment.
The function of the accountant, therefore, is to express an
honest and informed judgment regarding the financial position
and operating results of the issuer according to some acceptable
standard of accounting conventions. It is not merely a factfinding function.
We may now consider how this function is in practice dis
charged. While the work of accountants today involves the use
of a large staff, it is obviously impracticable for the accountant
even with a large staff to examine all the transactions of even a
moderate-sized corporation. His procedure is, therefore, a varied
one —in some cases, he will make a fairly complete independent
check; in other cases, he will make tests; in still other cases, he
must rely on the records of the corporation, satisfying himself
that they are so kept and checked as to justify such reliance as a
reasonable business procedure.
12
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In considering, therefore, what degree of responsibility may
wisely and rightfully be imposed on the accountant, one must
start from the premises that (a) his work is in part in the nature of
confirmation of facts, and in part an expression of judgment; (b)
his procedure is necessarily to a large extent one of testing—he
can not scrutinize every transaction; (c) his work is necessarily
carried on largely through subordinates.
It is clear that the accountant may incur liability under the act
without being guilty of either moral culpability or recklessness, if
a court holds that (a) facts within his knowledge were presented
in such a way as to mislead; or (b) the tests which he made were
not sufficiently extensive to justify him in forming a belief; or
(c) he was not justified in forming a belief on the evidence which
he examined without probing deeper. Furthermore, he will
presumably be liable for any misstatement which may be attrib
utable to the failure of his assistants to take steps which they
should have taken, even though he instructed them to take such
steps and believed, and had a right to believe, that they had
done so.
Surely, if any liability is to be so founded, it should at least be
restricted to the damage shown to have been caused by the default
proved against him or his assistants.
It is unnecessary for me to spend much time in pointing out how
far beyond such a standard of liability the act goes. The point
has already been fully discussed in the pamphlet entitled Ac
countants and the Securities Act, which has been circulated to its
members by the American Institute of Accountants, and in ad
dresses to accounting bodies made by the chief of the securities
division of the federal trade commission, the honorable Baldwin
B. Bane, on September 19, and on October 30, by Commissioner
James M. Landis. The discussion of the question by the former
concluded with the statement:
“Thus both theoretically and practically there is no probability
of one’s liability exceeding the aggregate amount at which the
securities were offered to the public.”

Commissioner Landis, taking what he seemed to regard as a more
hopeful view, said:
“It should be observed that each person whose liability on the
registration statement has been established is responsible in dam
ages to any purchaser of the security, whether such person shall
have purchased from him or from some other person. Theoreti
13
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cally this means that each person so liable can be held to a liabilityequivalent to that of the total offering price of the issue. Practi
cally, of course, no such large liability exists. Several factors will
operate to keep the liability within much smaller bounds. For
one thing, the value of a carefully floated issue can hardly be as
sumed to reach zero. For another, every purchaser would hardly
be likely to bring suit. Again, the issue of liability—generally, a
complicated question of fact—would be retriable in every suit,
and it beggars the imagination to assume that every jury faced
with such an issue would come to the same conclusion. Further
more, each person liable has a right of contribution against every
other person liable, unless the one suing is guilty of fraud and the
other is not. So that even eliminating the other practical factors
that I have mentioned, it would be necessary for every other
person liable on the registration statement to be insolvent, in
order that one of them would be affixed with the large theoretical
responsibility.”

These being the views entertained by persons who sought to reas
sure us so far as they honestly could, it is quite unnecessary to
consider what has been said by those who sought to excite our
fears. The liability is obviously one that no prudent business
man would be justified in assuming. And certainly accountants
have no right to be guiding investors if they are not practical busi
ness men as well as technically qualified accountants.
Let me emphasize again that in order to be subjected to such a
liability it is not necessary that the accountant should have been
fraudulent, or even reckless or incompetent. He may be held
liable merely because of an error of judgment regarding the extent
of the examination which he ought to make, or through honest
error or oversight on the part of a competent and ordinarily relia
ble subordinate. And if he is held liable in an important case, the
cost to him may easily equal the savings of his whole professional
career.
I believe in the case of most accountants—certainly it is true in
that of my own firm—the amount of fees received from work con
nected with new financing is a relatively small percentage of their
total annual fees. Why should they jeopardize not only the
earnings from their entire business, but their savings, in order to
undertake work which brings in perhaps five or ten per cent. of
their total income?
Every reputable accountant should be perfectly willing to as
sume a reasonable liability in respect of injury which can be
shown to be attributable to acts or default on his part, and no one
14
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would quarrel with the imposition of a liability of a punitive
character in cases of fraud; but only the clearest and most urgent
requirements of public policy could justify making accountants
or other experts liable for damages which bear no relation either
to the injuries they have caused or the compensation they have
received. I am convinced that no such requirement exists—on
the contrary, I believe that a wise regard for the public interest
would rather limit the financial responsibility of professional men
for errors of professional judgment. This, incidentally, is the
policy embodied in the new legislation on the question of auditors
in Germany, (Handelsgesetzbuch (Commercial code), 1931)
under which the liability of the accountant can not exceed a
fixed sum, unless fraud is shown.
It is not easy to see upon what theory of law the provision of
the act is based. Clearly, it is not founded in the ordinary law of
negligence; nor can it be brought within the doctrine of rescission.
It seems to me to be justifiable only on the theory that any issue
of securities in connection with which a material misstatement is
found to exist is a conspiracy, even though the misstatement is
due to oversight or even honest error. There is nothing in the
history of accounting in recent years to warrant such an attitude
towards the profession or that provision which puts on the ac
countant the burden of proving his innocence whenever a dis
gruntled purchaser of securities or striker makes charges against
him.
In my judgment, it is always wise to use restraint in imposing
financial liabilities upon professional men for errors of professional
judgment. Such errors, particularly where they become publicly
known, result in serious injury to the professional reputation of
the persons making them, and it is quite unnecessary to add a
personal liability in order to impress the professional man with
the necessity of care and thoroughness in forming his professional
judgments. The effect of imposing a pecuniary liability out of
all proportion to the compensation paid for the opinion will in
evitably be that those best qualified to express opinions will refuse
to assume the risks involved in doing so.
In the present instance, the risks are multiplied by the vague
ness and uncertainties of the obligations imposed. The act
makes the accountant liable if the part of the registration state
ment for which he is responsible “contained an untrue statement
of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be
15
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stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading, . .
and, in providing that it shall be a valid de
fense that the accountant “had reasonable ground to believe and
did believe, . . . that the statements therein were true and that
there was no omission to state a material fact required to be
stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading, . .
it prescribes that the standard of reasonable
ness “shall be that required of a person occupying a fiduciary
relationship.”
What explanations are going to be necessary in order to comply
with these requirements? Let me take a simple case. The
insurance commissioners have on several occasions prescribed
valuations for securities which were far in excess of current quoted
prices therefor. If one were consulted by someone to whom one
had a fiduciary relationship regarding a proposed investment in
an insurance company, certainly he would not be content to
explain that the securities were valued in accordance with the
schedules of the insurance commissioners without pointing out
that these valuations were substantially higher than those cur
rently realizable on the market. Suppose, however, that in a
balance-sheet forming part of a registration statement securities
were taken on the basis of the commissioner’s valuations—would
it be sufficient to state that fact, or would the accountant be
guilty of omission of a material fact if he failed to make any state
ment regarding the relation between such valuation and the
quoted market prices? Again, many public utilities provide for
depreciation on bases approved by state commissions, which
many accountants regard as quite inadequate. Is the accountant
safe if he states on what basis the depreciation provision has been
made, without expressing his own convictions regarding the in
adequacy of the provision?
In each of these cases it would seem that the accountant must
be safe, on the ground that he is entitled to rely on legal authority
whether his own judgment coincides with the view of the au
thorities or not. In many instances, however, the authority
for the practice followed will be accepted custom, rather than
specific authorization from a governmental body; and what is
to be the position when the accountant disagrees with the
custom?
Here let me draw attention to a point which perhaps has es
caped your attention—that the position of the accountant under
16
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the act differs from that of any other expert. Others may “re
port” and be liable only for the truth of the statements contained
in their report; the accountant is called upon to certify, and is
liable for the truth of the statements certified, not merely for the
truth of the statements contained in his certificate. Under a
strict interpretation of the law, the accountant would seem to be
liable if part of a statement covered by his certificate is held to be
untrue or misleading, even though he, in his certificate, disclaimed
responsibility for that particular part of the statement. It may
be said that such an interpretation would be unreasonable; but it
is certainly no more unreasonable than the explicit provision that
his liability is not to be measured by the injury caused by his act
or default. Further, it may be merely the reflection of the not
infrequent view that an auditor should give no certificate what
ever unless he can vouch for the complete truthfulness of the state
ment certified.
The fallacious view is quite widely held that the work of the
accountant is purely a fact-finding function, and that when his
work is completed he is in a position (if it has been properly per
formed) to make findings of definite and incontrovertible facts.
The special committee on cooperation with stock exchanges of the
American Institute of Accountants, whose membership has in
cluded partners in several of the largest firms in the country,
became convinced of the extreme importance of correcting this
too common misapprehension, and in a report which it made to
the New York stock exchange in September, 1932, it stressed this
point as the first on which the stock exchange should concentrate
in its effort to bring about more enlightened investment. It
began its report with the following statements:
“It (the committee) believes that there are two major tasks to
be accomplished—one is to educate the public in regard to the
significance of accounts, their value and their unavoidable limita
tions, and the other is to make the accounts published by corpora
tions more informative and authoritative.
“The nature of a balance-sheet or an income account is quite
generally misunderstood, even by writers on financial and ac
counting subjects. Professor William Z. Ripley has spoken of a
balance-sheet as an instantaneous photograph of the condition of
a company on a given date. Such language is apt to prove doubly
misleading to the average investor—first, because of the implica
tion that the balance-sheet is wholly photographic in nature,
whereas it is largely historical; and, secondly, because of the sug
gestion that it is possible to achieve something approaching
17
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photographic accuracy in a balance-sheet which, in fact, is neces
sarily the reflection of opinions subject to a (possibly wide) margin
of error.”

It then proceeded to discuss the problem in some detail; and in
concluding the report and making certain recommendations, it
offered this comment:

"... But even when all has been done that can be done, the
limitations on the significance of even the best of accounts must
be recognized, and the shorter the period covered by them the
more pronounced usually are these limitations. Accounts are
essentially continuous historical records; and as is true of history
in general, correct interpretations and sound forecasts for the
future can not be reached upon a hurried survey of temporary
conditions, but only by longer retrospect and a careful distinction
between permanent tendencies and transitory influences.”
I was extremely glad to note that Commissioner Landis, in his
address to which I have referred, recognized the point which I
have been trying to emphasize, in the following paragraph:

“Much also depends upon the method of expression, for what
should appropriately be expressed as inferences or deductions
from facts, and hence as opinions, are too often expressed as facts
themselves and hence for the purposes of legal liability, whether
at common law or under the act, become facts. It has been said,
and very rightly in my humble opinion, that most of accounting is
after all a matter of opinion. But though this may be true, I
have still to see the case of a prospective investor being offered a
balance-sheet and having it carefully explained to him that this
or that item is merely an opinion or deduction from a series of
other opinions mixed in with a few acknowledged facts. Ac
counting, as distinguished from law, has generally been portrayed
as an exact science, and its representations have been proffered
to the unlearned as representations of fact and not of opinion. If
it insists upon such fact representations, it is, of course, fair that
it should be burdened with the responsibility attendant upon
such a portrayal of its results.”
I have read the entire paragraph because it seems to me to have
a double importance. In the first place, it indicates an apprecia
tion on the part of a member of the commission of the point that
accounts are not statements of fact, and such recognition is funda
mental to the development of any sound regulations relating to
accounts and accountants. In the second place, it emphasizes
the danger which accountants run in putting forward as facts
what are really expressions of opinion.
18
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That the danger is not exaggerated by the commissioner is ap
parent from a consideration of the Ultramares case. That case
would apparently have been finally decided in favor of the ac
countants by the court of appeals of New York if the accountants
concerned had not stated as a fact that the balance-sheet which
they certified was in accord with the books of the company.
Doubtless they thought this was a fact, and doubtless it was a
fact in the sense in which they meant the language to be inter
preted, that the balance-sheet was in accord with the general
books. But Chief Justice Cardozo decided that a court might
properly regard the language as implying an agreement between
the balance-sheet and the books as a whole, and there were books
which contradicted the general books. Obviously, upon such an
interpretation, whether a balance-sheet agreed with the books
must always be in reality a matter of opinion (if for no other
reason because no accountant can be sure that he has seen all the
books that exist), and obviously even if the statement was made as
one of fact, no one was injured by it for no one would lend a nickel
on the faith of a statement that a balance-sheet agrees with the
books. Nevertheless, such is the mysterious nature of the law,
this point was sufficient to result in an order for retrial.
In the last sentence which I quoted from Commissioner Landis,
he seemed to imply, although he did not specifically say, that the
portrayal of accounts as statements of fact had been made by
accountants. I am not sure that this is so. Accountants may be
subject to some blame for not having done as much as they might
have done to resist the tendency of other people to regard accounts
as exact statements of fact, but I think that they themselves have
almost invariably put forth their reports as expressions of opinion.
Both here and in England, the words “in our opinion” have for
years been a standard phrase in accountants’ certificates. As
long ago as 1913, Dickinson, in his work Accounting Practice and
Procedure commented on the phrase at length. His comment
began with the statement: “Every balance sheet must be largely a
matter of opinion,” and ended with the sentence:
“So far from weakening the certificate, they (i.e., the words
‘in our opinion’) may rather be considered as strengthening it, in
that they imply that the signer has given his certificate, not with
foolhardy assurance, but with a realization of the inherent impos
sibility of saying, absolutely, that one balance-sheet is correct and
any other incorrect.” (Arthur Lowes Dickinson, Accounting Prac
tice and Procedure, pages 236, 237.)
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And while very little testimony was given on behalf of accountants
before the committees which considered the securities act, the
little which was given included this colloquy between the mem
bers of the senate committee on banking and currency and
Colonel A. H. Carter, who was, I believe, the only accounting
witness:

“Mr. Carter. I mean that that statement itself should have
been the subject of an examination and audit by an independent
accountant.
“Senator Gore. Before filing?
“Mr. Carter. Before filing.
“Senator Gore. Is that patterned after the English system?
“Mr. Carter. Yes, sir.
“Senator Reynolds. Together with an opinion.
“Mr. Carter. That is all they can give; that is all they can
give. That is all anyone can give as to a balance-sheet.
“Senator Wagner. Well, basically, are not these facts that
have got to be alleged rather than an opinion?
“Mr. Carter. Under the terms of the bill it has to be given
under oath. I do not see that anyone can certify under oath that
a balance-sheet giving many millions of dollars of assets is as a
matter of fact correct. He can state his opinion based upon a
thorough investigation.”
But whatever they have been represented or supposed to be,
accounts are not mere statements of fact, but represent the ap
plication to facts of judgment and accounting principles. Truth
in accounts is not, therefore, a simple matter of correspondence
between fact and statement—accounts are true if they result
from the application of honest judgment and reasonable account
ing principles to the relevant facts. The question that should
really be put to the accountant is not whether the balance-sheet
is true, but whether it is fair—fair in the accounting principles on
which it is based; fair in the way in which those principles are
applied to the facts, and fair in the way in which the results are
presented. These are matters of opinion.
The act stresses the obligation to state every material fact
necessary to make the registration statement not misleading, and
among the material facts in relation to any accounts none is more
material than the fact that the accounts themselves and the certifi
cate required from the accountant in relation to those accounts
are, and must of necessity be, expressions of opinion. Indeed,
the act, in speaking of truth in accounts without some such qualifi
cation is itself apt to mislead investors, in the same way as was
20
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Professor Ripley’s reference to a balance-sheet as an “instantane
ous photograph.”
At this point, I should like to suggest that section 19 can be
used to clarify and modify the provisions of section 11. Clearly,
only action by congress can remove the fundamental and, as I
feel, insuperable obstacles to the free acceptance of appointments
under the act by accountants which have been created by the
imposition of a liability bearing no relation either to the injury
caused by the accountant or the compensation received by him.
If, however, this major difficulty could be removed, the remaining
problem could probably be solved by judicious use by the com
mission of the powers conferred on it under section 19.
Under that section, the commission has power for the purposes
of the act to define accounting terms used therein and to prescribe
the method to be followed in the preparation of accounts. It
seems to me highly desirable that under the provisions of this
section the commission should define what constitutes a “true”
balance-sheet or a “ true’’ profit-and-loss statement. Such defini
tion would, I think, necessarily follow the general line that I have
indicated. Accounts would be held to be true if they represented
the application of honest judgment and acceptable methods of
accounting to all the relevant facts which were known or ought
to have been known to the person preparing or certifying them at
the time of preparation or certification. I suggest, also, that the
commission should supplement the definition by indicating that
accounting principles would be deemed acceptable which are
either (a) prescribed Or approved by governmental authorities to
which the issuer is subject; or (b) sanctioned by common practice,
it being recognized that in many instances alternative methods
are sanctioned; or (c) are inherently fair and appropriate. It
should be emphasized that principles will not be regarded as
reasonable unless they are mutually consistent and are con
sistently applied.
The point may be urged that what must be shown in order to
avert liability is not that the balance-sheet or profit-and-loss
account as a whole is true, but that the statements of fact con
tained in it are true. Balance-sheets and profit-and-loss accounts
are not, of course, couched in the form of statements of fact; but a
description with an amount set opposite it is fairly capable of
being judged as a statement of fact. The common heading:
“Land, buildings, plant and machinery, at cost,” with a figure set
21
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opposite, seems at first blush to be a simple statement of fact; but
in practice, what is fairly to be regarded as cost will often be a
difficult matter of opinion, and always the question remains
whether any and if so what amplification of the heading is neces
sary to make the statement not misleading.
You may think that I am being technical; but may I remind
you that our own accumulated savings may be at stake in this
matter, and also that the highest court of Massachusetts held not
many years ago that a statement was false and that its falsity
gave rise to liability on the part of those signing it, on the sole
ground that a reserve for depreciation had been shown under the
heading “reserves” on one side of the balance-sheet instead of
being deducted from the assets on the other. It was only after
this decision that the law of Massachusetts was amended by the
insertion of this proviso: “. . . provided, that if a report of condi
tion as a whole states the condition of the corporation with sub
stantial accuracy, in accordance with usual methods of keeping
accounts, it shall not be deemed to be false.”
I am convinced that to make the act practicable in its working
it is essential that some general ruling as to what constitutes truth
in accounts along the lines I have suggested shall be put forward
by the commission. As I have indicated, such a statement would
serve the double purpose—first, of tending to prevent the invest
ing public from attaching undue significance to accounts; and,
secondly, of preventing accountants from being harassed or pen
alized through unduly technical interpretations of the provisions
of the law.
I would not have you think that in this discussion I have ex
hausted the points in the act which are of interest and importance
to the profession. I should have liked to discuss at length the
provision by which the burden of proof is thrown upon the de
fendant; the opportunities that the act offers to blackmailers; the
absence of any provision by which those unwarrantably attacked
can recover the costs of their defense; and other features which
seem to me to require amendment if a just balance is to be struck.
However, you will find them fully discussed elsewhere.
In conclusion, I desire to say that I am in full sympathy with
the general purposes of the act, and that the criticisms which I
have offered of some of its provisions are not merely inspired by a
narrow self-interest but rest upon the profound conviction, which
I expressed at the beginning of this address, that unduly drastic
22
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measures defeat their own purpose and are not in the ultimate
interest of those whom it is sought to protect. I should be ex
tremely sorry if the effect of the securities act should be to place
the distribution of securities and all the work attendant on such
distribution in the least responsible hands.
I think, also, that we, as accountants, owe a duty to small in
vestors in any discussion of the act to point out that the ordinary
vicissitudes of business make commercial securities necessarily
hazardous and unsuitable for the investment of small savings, and
that even if a securities act diminishes the hazards, in some re
spects, it can not change their essential character. A realistic
view would recognize the necessity for some governmentally
fostered system for the safe investment of small savings; a broad
market, subject to requirements for frank disclosure with pen
alties not unduly drastic attaching thereto, for what may be
termed “business investments”; and some medium, entirely
divorced from the idea of investment, for the gratification of the
seemingly ineradicable instinct for gambling.
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